Disparate Treatment Claim
Through the PDA, Congress amended Title VII to include that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or other related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes … as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work[.]”[1] A disparate treatment claim under the PDA asserts “that an employer intentionally treated a complainant less favorably than employees with the ‘complainant’s qualifications’ but outside the complainant’s protected class.”[2]
A plaintiff “can prove disparate treatment either (1) by direct evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas.”[3] Under that framework, “[f]irst, the plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If the defendant is able to articulate such a reason, the plaintiff then [bears] the burden of proving that reason to be a mere pretext for discrimination.”[4]
A Pregnancy Discrimination Act plaintiff “can establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination by showing that
‘(1) she was pregnant,
(2) she was qualified for her job,
(3) she was subjected to an adverse employment decision, and
(4) there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment decision.’”[5]
A plaintiff can satisfy element (4) “through comparison to ‘another employee who is similarly situated in her or his ability or inability to work [and] has received more favorable benefits.’”[6]
Disparate Treatment Claim
“In evaluating a disparate-impact claim, courts focus on the effects of an employment practice, determining whether they are unlawful irrespective of motivation or intent.”[7] “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the disparate impact theory, ‘a plaintiff must: (1) identify a specific employment practice; and (2) present data indicating that the specific practice had an adverse impact on a protected group.’”[8]
[1] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
[2] Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1345, 191 L.Ed.2d 279 (2015) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
[3] Id.
[4] Ensley–Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1224 (6th Cir. 1996).
[5] Latowski v. Northwoods Nursing Ctr., 549 Fed. Appx. 478, 483 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 2000)).
[6] Id. (quoting Ensley–Gaines, 100 F.3d at 1226).
[7] Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1345, 191 L.Ed.2d 279 (2015) (emphasis in original).
[8] Chandler v. Regions Bank, 573 Fed. Appx. 525, 528 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 494 (6th Cir. 2013) ) (discussing sex-based discrimination claims).
